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4In a new economic geography framework with input-output linkages, this study analyses decisions
made by foreign firms about their location within Hungary. These firm-to-firm contacts are modelled by
creating several corporate customer and supplier access measures for all new foreign corporations. In
order to see the impact of these variables other forces of agglomeration such as distance to Western
European markets and dispersion forces such as high wages are taken into account. Investigation is
carried out on a small-to-medium sized European economy that has just gone through economic tran-
sition involving almost unprecedented rapid market liberalisation. A rich dataset of corporate tax returns
of Hungarian firms between 1992 and 2002 as well as annual labor surveys are used to get location,
sales and wage data. Various econometric specifications of both discrete choice and count data mod-
els are applied to provide robustness of results that may be crucial when working with firm level data.
JEL classification: F23, R3, R12, C35.
Keywords: economic geography, industrial location, FDI, regional policy, discrete choice models.
A tanulmány az új földrajzi közgazdaságtan keretei között vizsgálja a külföldi befektetõk telephelyvá-
lasztását egy országon belül. Egy monopolisztikus versenyre épülõ egyszerû modellben bemutatja az
ágazati kapcsolatok közvetlen használatát, és diszkrét függõ változójú modellekben megbecsüli a te-
lephelyválasztást meghatározó tényezõk szerepét. A klasszikus befektetést vonzó változók mellett, mint
az alacsony bérek, a fejlett infrastruktúra és a nemzetközi határokhoz való közelség, elemzi a végsõ fo-
gyasztók és a vállalati partnerekhez való közelség szerepét. Robusztus eredmények biztosítása érde-
kében a feltételes és beágyazott (nested) logit, Poisson, illetve negatív binomiális regressziós modellek
keretében a tanulmány számos specifikációt tesztel. Az adatok az APEH-panel adatbázisából származ-
nak, amely tartalmazza az összes magyarországi vállalatot. A dolgozat az 1993–2002 közötti idõszak-
ban jelentõs külföldi tulajdonnal létrejött feldolgozóipari cégek telephely-választási döntéseit elemzi.
Abstract 
Összefoglalás
5In Central and Eastern Europe, rapid changes and restructuring in manufacturing have taken place
since 1990 and spatial inequality has risen substantially along with new investments by firms entering
countries previously closed to foreigners. This period may be characterized by economic liberalization
and opening up markets to foreigners. Prior to 1989, there has been hardly any foreign direct invest-
ment in Hungary, while by 2003, the FDI stock reached almost 50% of the GDP. One would expect that
early investments (1989-1992) favoured the capital city and the borderline regions but then, capital
spread out more evenly in a small country like Hungary as time went by. However, this has not been the
case. Instead, agglomeration of investments and a spatial polarization have been visible phenomena in
general and in most sectors of the industry. For example, ratio of the GDP per capita in the two richest
counties to the one in the two least developed counties rose from 2.3 in 1993 to 2.9 in 2000.
Considering all 19 roughly similarly-sized counties in Hungary (i.e. taking out the large capital region of
Budapest), our data suggest that new investments were often concentrated in a few regions. During the
period 1993-2002, the top 3 counties (out of 19) were consistently responsible for 35%-40% of new for-
eign firm establishments. As a result, richer counties (Vas, Gyõr-Moson-Sopron, or Fejér) managed to
increase their share of FDI over time - as reported in Table 1. Of course, the capital city has attracted
the largest share of FDI overall. During the same period, Budapest attracted 1.18 new firms per 1000
inhabitants while the same measure is less than 0.2 for the worst performing two counties. The same
pattern is true for a set of countries in the region: manufacturing of electronic devices by firms such as
Flextronics in Central and Eastern Europe can be found in a fairly narrow band from North Poland
through the Czech Republic, West Slovakia, West and Central Hungary down to North Slovenia and
Croatia.
1
One reason behind this agglomeration tendency is that new firms have a high propensity to settle at
places where economic activities are already established as suggested Ottaviano et al. (2003, p. 7.).
But them why do firms like to settle at places that other firms chose? Further, why has agglomeration of
new investment been such a visible feature of development? Of course, Alfred Marshall argued a cen-
tury ago that certain types of externalities may explain such pattern. Both in theory and empirics, local-
ization economies, arising from the proximity of firms to each other has often been found to be the ma-
in cause of agglomerations, industrial clusters or even cities. Exploring one particular feature of this
externality to explain agglomeration forces at work, is the focus of this paper. We believe that a deep-
er understanding of how foreign firms pick a particular area for their plant would help economic policy
make a better use of European and national development resources.
In this paper, we analyse decisions made by foreign firms about their location within Hungary in a new
economic geography framework with input-output linkages. These firm-to-firm contacts are modelled by
creating several corporate customer and supplier access measures for firms based on firm level data.
In order to see the impact of these variables other forces of agglomeration such as distance to Western
1. Introduction
1
For details see Barta (2003).
European markets and dispersion forces such as high wages are taken into account. Investigation is
carried out on a small-to-medium sized European economy that has just gone through economic tran-
sition involving almost unprecedented rapid market liberalisation. Rich datasets of corporate tax returns
and annual labor surveys are used to get location, sales and wage data. Various econometric specifi-
cations of both discrete choice and count data models are applied to provide robustness of results that
may be crucial when working with firm level data.
The paper is organised as follows. Section two summarizes the related literature analysing results of firm
location in general and FDI location in particular. We present the theoretical background of location
choice in section three. Datasets and variables are described in section four discussing advantages
and pitfalls of micro datasets as well as explaining the creation of the access variables. Section five
presents the econometric methodologies along with all the results and robustness checks. The last sec-
tion concludes.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
6
7Before turning to the theoretical background and the estimation of the model, let us briefly present a
background of economic geography and discuss some key empirical results in location choice with a
special emphasis on Europe.
With the emergence of new economic geography (or NEG) models, issues related to the marked dif-
ference between developed and underdeveloped regions have been given a solid analytical frame-
work.
2
These models aim at uncovering the essential reasons behind both agglomeration and disper-
sion of economic activity. There are many reasons for the concentration of production such as the
attractiveness of servicing a large market, the proximity to suppliers of intermediate goods or various
forms of technological spill-overs. Of course, agglomeration forces do not prevail without boundaries,
there are dispersion forces in action, too. High wages will make certain wage-sensitive industries inca-
pable to offset rising costs. These companies will at some point opt to locate in the other region.
Although they will face much higher transaction costs when selling to the larger (and richer) region, pro-
duction costs will be much lower in the other region.
Such new economic geography models have been employed to explain location of overall economic
activity by Krugman (1991), industrial clusters in Fujita et al. (1999, Ch. 16.) or location of various man-
ufacturing sectors by Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000). Both theoretical and empirical work in this field are
centered around two key determinants of location: agglomeration externalities and market access.
These notions will play a central role in this study and hence, it is worth giving a brief account of the key
ideas, emphasising the difficulties that often arise when one tries to disentangle various forces.
3
Agglomeration externalities were first emphasised by Marshall, and formalisation of most such exter-
nalities may be found in Fujita et al. (1999, Ch. 16.). In most of the early models, labour migration was
essential for agglomeration forces to work: an increased population generated greater demand inviting
more firms to settle in a larger city, and this allowed for a lower import bill and hence, lower living costs
in general. However, even in the long run, labour migration is rather low in Europe in nominal terms as
well as compared with the United States. Thus, another agglomeration force was required to explain the
desire to co-locate in spite of low migration propensities. This explains why the incorporation of inter-
company sales or in other words, input-output (I-O) linkages were so important for empirical work.
These linkages try to capture trading costs between firms explicitly thus, provide a motive for co-loca-
tion.
Of course, there are other well known reasons for agglomeration, drivers of industrial clustering. One
such reason that makes worth locating close to one another is the potential of knowledge spillover. This
is true for human as well as physical capital. The attraction to work close to other people is noted in
Marshall (1920) and the importance of face to face communication is discussed in Leamer and Stolper
(2000). As for firms, proximity allows to exchange inventions while technology spillovers help increase
2. Related literature
2
For details, see for example Baldwin et al. (2003) or Ottaviano et al. (2003).
3
An excellent survey of key hypotheses emerging from models of new economic geography and their mixed empirical support can be found in
Head and Mayer (2004).
productivity using other firms’ knowledge. Another such agglomeration force is labour pooling: firms
enjoy the presence of a larger set of labour where the specific knowledge required by the firm, may just
be fished out easily (as in Amiti and Pissarides [2001]).
Barry et al. (2003) emphasised that it is rather difficult to disentangle the agglomeration and the demon-
stration effect because of a reputation effect that makes it optimal to mimic each others’ location deci-
sions. In their empirical study, demonstration is considered to be a part of co-location externalities that
is not explained by agglomeration variables such as R&D intensity (spillover), excess job turnover
(labour market thickness). Of course, information sharing and demonstration effects are closely interre-
lated.
As for the access to markets, the key idea that firm location depends on the proximity of demand was
introduced a long ago, and Harris (1954) devised the simplest aggregate market-potential function.
Market potential has been first investigated in an international context; proximity to key markets and
suppliers has been explicitly featured in empirical works explaining overall economic activity or per
capita income. Redding and Venables (2004) argue that a country’s wage level (proxied by per capi-
ta income) is dependent on its capacity to reach export markets and to manage to get hold of the nec-
essary intermediate goods cheaply. Head and Mayer (2005) look at Japanese investments carried out
in the European Union. Results show that apart from a very important market potential measure, a num-
ber of traditional explanatory variables (e.g. taxes) and agglomeration variables turn to be significant
as well.
This paper looks at a narrow location choice problem, when firms may choose a site within a country only.
There have been several papers dealing with location decisions of foreign investors within one country.
Crozet et al. (2004) study location of FDI in France using a model of oligopolistic competition to simulate
corporate choice of location. They find that firms of the same nationality like to group together, locations
close to home country are chosen more frequently, and some industries (like car plants) have a strong
tendency to agglomerate. Similarly, a study by Head and Ries (2001) looks at Japanese investments in
the US and finds that firms belonging to the same keiritsu tend to settle close to each other.
Some studies considered countries of similar size and population to Hungary. Barrios et al. (2003) look at
multinationals’ location choice in Ireland with special interest in the role of agglomeration forces as well as
state support. They find that agglomeration forces contributed substantially to location choices but prox-
imity to major ports and airports was also helpful. More importantly, they find evidence that higher public
incentives in designated areas have increased the probability of multinational investment. Figueiredo et al.
(2002a) took Portuguese data to look at, among other factors, the home field advantage.
Anecdotal evidence confirms that agglomeration forces are active in transition economies of Central
and Eastern Europe. The presence of industrial clusters is an easy-to-spot feature of new manufactur-
ing base in the region, including the motor vehicle cluster in North-West Hungary, West Slovakia or
South-West of the Czech Republic. Also, there is some evidence showing that large multinationals lured
in their usual suppliers.
4
Results with data on these economies have just started to emerge of late.
Disdier and Mayer (2004) compare French investment in the Western and Eastern part of Europe. They
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4
The latest example is Hyundai motors in Slovakia where eight other Korean firms announced to follow Hyundai.
Related literature
9
find that location choice is positively influenced by local demand and proximity to France increases the
probability of a given country being chosen. Cieslik (2003) uses a Poisson model on 50 Polish regions
to find that proximity of key export targets, industry and service agglomeration, and road network are
the important magnets for foreign investment.
As for Hungary, Boudier-Bensebaa (2005) focuses on the agglomeration effect and estimates motives
of location choice using regionally aggregated data. The distribution of the FDI stocks in counties are
found to be related to labor conditions and manufacturing density and the number of existing enter-
prises. Fazekas (2003) looks at the concentration of FDI from a labour market point of view to study what
impact capital inflow had on the regional structure of the country. The paper finds that concentration of
foreign-owned enterprises is just marginally higher than that of the domestically owned ones. However,
FEs are concentrated in a different pattern, being located closely to the Western border. The approach
of this paper is somewhat different to Fazekas (2003) in that it investigates the agglomeration patterns
of foreign firms only.
The theoretical framework aims to emphasise business to business relations as a key driver of location
decisions. The main relationship between any two firms is a potential of supplier-buyer link, i.e. one
firm’s output is the intermediate good of another. Modelling and measuring this potential will be in the
centre of this analysis. The model is using the “classic” ingredients of new economic geography based
on the monopolistic competition of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and first presented by Krugman (1991). One
key aspect of firm-to-firm relationship here is related to input-output linkages that were introduced by
Krugman and Venables (1995) in order to model the fact that firms sell goods not only to consumers
but to other firms as well. This paper follows the concise display of multi-country and multi-industry
model in Fujita et al. (1999, Chapter 15A).
There is monopolistic competition in all sectors producing a range of differentiated goods. The paper
focuses on manufacturing. The agriculture sector, which has been present in many similar models, will
be overlooked. True, a dispersion force will be lost but in the lack of large-scale migration, wages and
local consumer demand should be strong enough to foster agglomeration.
There are r=1...R regions, j=1...J industries, with n
r
j
firms producing a variety each of industry j in reg-
ion r.
Profit for each firm depends on firm- and industry-level characteristics. Firm-level characteristics such
as technology advantage over industry peers and quality of management are unobserved. However,
these features are assumed to be independent from the choice of location. Another determinant of a
given firm’s profit depends on such industry features as (average) technology, skill requirements, trans-
action costs and location of markets. These are indeed region-dependent factors. Thus, profit for firm i
in industry j and region r will come from these two terms and we assume additive separability:
(1)
Since the focus is on location choice, the assumption of additive separability allows for working with Π
r
j
only. Assume now that fixed cost of starting a new business is the same in all regions, and the cost of
capital is unchanged through space as well – this can be considered as one key difference between
national and international models. Firms pay taxes and receive investment support. However, in Hun-
gary, local economic policy is not defined by counties but determined at the settlement level, and
regional tax incentives are relative novelty, so it was assumed that region specific state intervention is
zero. The profit is simply:
(2)
The representative consumer draws utility from consuming a composite manufacturing good: U=C
μ
M
.
However, the consumer enjoys several manufacturing goods, and the composite good consumed
comes from a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) subfunction of the available varieties.
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(3)
The elasticity of substitution between goods is measured by σ j. Theoretically it measures to what extent
goods are close to each other, i.e. whether consumers are easily willing to replace one with another. If
it is small, products differ, in case of σ j=, the products are homogenous, and the market structure is
identical to perfect competition.
As it is the case in models following the Dixit-Stiglitz tradition, profit maximisation yields a price that
equals marginal cost and a markup, j :
(4)
In our case, the markup depends on the elasticity of substitution. Assuming that firms have the same
size, and there are N
r
j
firms in region r, it can be shown that the markup is:
(5)
Indeed, if two products are close substitutes, the market power to set prices should be small, hence
the low markup. It is assumed that there is a large enough number of firms, hence:
, i.e. the markup is not dependent on consumption. This assumption is crucial
for it yields that mill-pricing is optimal.
Firms use a set of goods produced by firms in other industries that are aggregated by a CES subutility
function into a composite good. The intermediate good price index, G
r
j
denoting the minimum cost of
purchasing a unit of this composite good, is a key variable in this setup for firms benefit from supplier
proximity. If a greater quantity of necessary intermediate goods is produced locally, less transportation
cost will have to be paid. Hence, production costs will be lower, too. This creates a forward linkage.
Here, the intermediate price index is weighted average (with n
l
j
being the number of relevant firms
5
) of
f.o.b. prices (p
l
jτ j
l_r
that already include an iceberg type transport cost, τ j
l_r
≥1: (i.e. for the home region
only τ j
l_r
=1 ).
(6)
This way of incorporating the price index implies the love of variety effect. The intermediate price index
for a firm in industry j of region r is G
r
j
. Input-output coefficients are denoted by io
ij
determining the share
of industry j in all output used by industry i. In a small country, industry buys goods and services from
abroad and the import coefficient, io
j*
, for each industry gives the share of a composite imported good
(priced G
j
W
). Since data come from a complete national input-output (I-O) table, ∑ J
i=1
io
ij
+ io
j*
=1, ∀j  J. 
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Later, the number of firms may be replaced with volume of output.
(7)
Firms sell their product to consumers and firms who use other firms’ output as their input. This latter
gives rise to a system of input-ouput linkages – a key agglomeration force.
Now the marginal cost function of a representative firm in industry j and region r may be defined as fol-
lows:
(8)
where w
r
is the nominal wage, GP
r
j
is the composite price index of intermediate goods and b
r
is a vec-
tor of other location dependent non-wage factors of the locally consumed production such as commu-
nication infrastructure.
Let us define q
j
rl
, as demand in a region l for a unit of industry j output, produced in region r. Demand
can be derived from the CES utility:
Expenditure on the j–th industrial goods for a given region (E
j
l
) comes from two sources: consumers
(who spend a μ j
l
fraction of their income on l region, j industry goods) and other firms coming from all
industries.
(9)
In equilibrium, X
r
j
, the supply of an industry j in region r will be equal to demand from Hungary and the
rest of the world.
(10)
where QW represents foreign demand.
Unlike in Fujita et al. (1999), this paper does not intend to end up with a set of equations and simulate
results. Instead of a general equilibrium approach we need to be “short sighted” and consider a partial
equilibrium without dynamic effects of an investment. In the long run equilibrium, prices are adjusted
taking externalities into account. For example, wages or land prices will reflect benefits of agglomera-
tion and lower prices in one region will only signal poorer circumstances. In the short run, disequilibria
may exist and entry of firms (bidding up wages and input prices) shall be considered as a force to bring
prices closer to their equilibrium value. The main goal of this exercise is to obtain a corporate profit func-
tion that will be linked to the settlement decisions of firms in the empirical work.
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Theoretical framework
13
So, the profit function can now be rewritten:
(11)
where is a monotonically decreasing function of the industry specific elasticity
of substitution, σ j. Note, that this measure is industry-dependent only, and hence will be empirically irrel-
evant.
Let us define the aggregate demand variable, AD
r
j
as
(12)
Note that the way demand is set up creates a backward linkage: firms want to be close to their markets
and potential customers.
So, the profit function is:
(13)
The profit function captures both key notions formerly introduced. Access to markets is incorporated
both for firms and for final consumers. Agglomeration economies will be captured by some b j
r
variables
as well as some of the access variables. The way demand is set up allows the introduction of some of
the key business to business relationships.
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An important contribution of this paper is the application of dataset that includes all firms throughout
their lifetime including the year of entry and exit. Thus, final corporate decisions may be looked at
instead of announcement of investment projects that may or may not have been realised. Furthermore,
instead of estimations and aggregations, this dataset allows for creation of output variables based on
the actual firm-level sales data only.
4.1. The corporate dataset
There are two key datasets in the study. The corporate dataset used here, is based on annual balance
sheet data submitted to the Tax Authority (APEH). This version comes from the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
The APEH dataset contains information on all registered, double entry book-keeping firms. Data include
industry code, size of employment, share of foreign ownership and a county code. Data are available
annualy for the 1992-2002 period. The number of corporations varies year to year, rising from 57,862 in
1992 to 184,703 in 2002. The dataset was improved by the Economics Department of the Magyar Nem-
zeti Bank as well as the CEU Labor Project. (For details on the data, see the Appendix.)
In its tax report, each company reports a sales figure that can be picked up from its balance sheet
attached to the earnings report. Sales data for a firm i operating in industry j registered in region r at
time t is denoted by: x
j
r(t)
(i).
The year of firm birth equals the year of first appearance in the dataset, i.e. the first year of submitting
a report to the Tax Authority. For this is compulsory, there should be little error in measuring the entry
date. Foreign ownership is defined whenever the foreign share in equity capital passes a 10% thresh-
old. For foreign companies defined this way, the average foreign share is very high and results are quite
robust to raising the threshold to 25%. Also, whenever foreign ownership is low at the beginning, in most
cases it will rise substantially after the first few years.
Overall, the dataset is composed of 5350 location settlements by firms with foreign ownership in man-
ufacturing only. Only 4557 may be certainly considered as new investment rather than foreign acquisi-
tion, and this paper deals with new investments only. Industries are grouped in sectors according to
two-digit NACE codes. With merging some industries (e.g. clothing and leather), and excluding food
production, there remain 15 sectors; Table 2. reports the main characteristics. As for changes through
time, the furniture (and other misc.) industry fared the best and textiles the worst.
There are some coefficients that are not estimated but taken from other sources: Input-output table
comes from Hungarian Statistics Office’s publication on 1998 data [KSH (2001)]. This is the only I-O
table available for the time period used. However, the assumption that input requirements per sector
have not greatly changed in a decade seems acceptable. The data indeed show that production is spe-
cialized, about half the value of output comes from purchasing goods and services from other produc-
ers. Out of domestic input, some 40% comes from buying goods, 55% from market services (including
construction) and 5% from non-market services.
14
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4.2. Equation for estimation
The profit function for the econometric model is created as follows. Consider the profit function (13),
where profit is determined by labour costs, aggregate demand, intermediate good prices, and other
cost factors, and take logs to get a linear relationship.
(14)
Aggregate demand (AD
r
j
) will be measured by final good demand, access to foreign demand and cor-
porate market access. Final good demand is proxied by purchasing power of consumers that is meas-
ured by the variable INC, which is decomposed into the number of inhabitants, Pop and income per
capita, IPC. The intermediate good price index (GP
r
j
) cannot be measured directly, so it will have to be
proxied by supplier access variables. Given the market structure, the intermediate price index will be
negatively correlated with the supply of these goods. The vector of cost factors (b
r(t)
) includes some
basic features of development that are not industry specific. A more developed county should yield
lower transaction costs and hence, marginal cost of production. We use several such measure and look
for a positive relationship between development and location choice. As for the labour market, wage
r(t)
measures the local wage. Wage variables were calculated from the LMS data and reflect (gross) labour
costs that should be expected by a firm looking to settle in the given county.
Finally, we need to introduce the time dimension that has been so far overlooked. Explanatory variables
are lagged one year for two reasons. The economic rationale (see “time-to-build” models) is that firms
may be assumed to spend a year between investment decision and actual functioning (that is picked
up by the data). The econometric support stems from a requirement to try to avoid endogeneity, and
lagging will free the model of simultaneity bias. We also need to assume that firms at time t considering
values of explanatory variables at time t–1, pick a county independently of each other. Agglomeration
works as firms locate close to other firms that had settled previously, but there is no strategic interac-
tion between firms settling at time t. This is a necessary assumption for using the logit model.
For parsimonious notation, let us introduce the variable ACC
j
(m)r
that includes all access variables. Note
that since ψ j is not county dependent, it shall be dropped. As a result, our expected profit function for
a firm i is:
(15)
where the error term, includes all the non-observed variables. Table 3 reports basic data on all
our variables.
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4.3. From firm data to access variables
In this section, creation of variables, which are used in estimations, is explained.
Unit transport costs are estimated by assuming a very simple relationship:
(16)
i.e. it depends on the distance and on the cost of transporting one dollar worth of good by one kilome-
ter. All data refer to distance by car, thus the road network that is crucial for transportation of goods is
indeed taken into account.
In reality we know little about coefficients of the relationship above. Studies with international data make
use of the availability of cross-regional (i.e. international) figures for trade. This allows explicitly to esti-
mate transportation costs. Here, it is assumed that shipping a good to 200 km costs twice the amount
it does for 100 km. Note, that this is higher than some estimates for international shipment costs (e.g.
Hummels [2000]). However, our variable includes all costs related to doing business.
The value of a typical package of industrial output on 1 km comes from the World Bank
database on international freight costs. True, these figures are based on more developed market data,
and aggregation will mask many features. However, it helps correct for the fact that it is cheaper to ship
€100 worth of laptop PC than the same value of steel. (See Table 2b.)
There are various ways to measure distance between counties ( ), and here a simple method is
chosen. First, using the KSH “T-STAR” database on settlements, the most important city per county is
picked (i.e. with the largest number of manufacturing plants). Note that picking the key city was straight-
forward for in all but one case, the largest city was at least twice the size of the second. Second, dis-
tance between any two counties is defined by measuring the road distance between the representative
cities. It is assumed that goods are transported by trucks only, and that vehicles move at the same
speed and costs are indifferent to road quality.
All access variables to be tested in forthcoming subsections are based on output figures per county
and sector (Y
j
r(t)
). These numbers are determined by aggregating sales figures from the balance sheet
data for all the relevant firms i (in industry j and region r time t ): .
Corporate access variables measure proximity to firms that may be relevant for a new company, and
the access variable is the sum of output by firms weighted by distance and share in inter-company tra-
de. From theory, we need one variable to measure demand (MA
j
r
) and another one to proxy supplier
access (SA
j
r
). Bear in mind, that although supplier and market access variables are compiled in a sim-
ilar fashion, they measure different types of variables. The market access is about demand, while the
supplier access is just a proxy to (intermediate goods) prices.
Further, both variables are divided into two components: one to pick up access to local (internal or with-
in county) firms and another one for non-local (external or outside the county) firms. The reason for such
dichotomy comes from the suspicion that the effect of distance is not linear, and firms clustered in one
city or in a few cities close to each other, enjoy special agglomeration effects.
6
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In a somewhat similar setup, Amiti and Javorcik (2003) created such aggregate access variables.
Description of the data and variables
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Theoretically these are the basic access variables we need. However, there may be (and as we will see
it, there is indeed) a strong correlation between SAloc and MAloc, and so is between SAnat and MAnat.
One possible reason for correlation between access variables is the fact that own industry output influ-
ences both the supplier and the market access variable strongly. This stems from the structure of com-
merce between firms: companies trade the most with other companies in the very same industry.
7
On
average, intra-industry trade amounts to one third of total inter-company sales, and this exacerbates
correlation between the MAloc and SAloc variables. To remedy this, a new variable, IPloc is introduced
that measures own industry output only. (This of course is also true for the non-local (national) vari-
ables.)
Accordingly, corporate demand may be proxied by a local and a national (all regions except for the
local one) industry dependent market access variables (local: MAloc
j
r
, national: MAnat
j
r
).
(17)
In a similar spirit, the intermediate good price index is proxied by two supplier access variables:
(18)
Importantly, for equations  and  we limit the input-output coefficients such that i≠j.
For cases when i=j, IP
j
r
is introduced to measures own industry output only.
(19)
Access to foreign markets influencing both demand and intermediate good prices, is measured by a
single foreign access variable (FMA
j
r
). This takes into account that export is a crucial determinant of the
revenue of Hungarian firms and the average import share reached 34% for manufacturing. By the the-
ory, the direct market access to foreign (i.e. in countries n=1,2...N) firms and customers should be
taken into account.
8
However, due to data limitation problems, this paper proxies access to foreign mar-
kets by taking into account the distance to the key export borders.
(20)
where ts
n
is the shares of trade to the n–th direction.
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This feature makes the use of models with two sectors, such as upstream and downstream industries, impossible.
8
Amiti and Javorcik (2003) face the same challenge for Chinese subsidiaries of multinational firms that typically produce a great deal of their out-
put for foreign markets. In their paper, access to foreign markets is proxied by the tariff rate but European free trade in manufactured goods makes
this unnecessary.
9
We used distance to the borders: West/Austria: Hegyeshalom; South/Croatia: Letenye; North/Slovakia: Komárom, East/Ukraine: Záhony, Airport:
Ferihegy/Budapest.
Business access or BA
j
r
picks up access to services such as banking, accounting or lodging, as a spe-
cial determinant of production costs. For services are likely to be used locally, only consider access to
local business services.
(21)
where k includes various service sectors of the economy.
4.4. Wages and other variables
The cost of labor may be a crucial dispersion force and hence, its careful modeling is important. To get
detailed wage data, a large employer-employee dataset is used that comes from annual Labour Market
Survey (LMS) data compiled by the Ministry of Labour, containing employment data on a sample of
some 140.000 employees per year. Employees are picked independently of their employers and the
large sample size allows for annual coverage of all industries in almost all counties.
This dataset allows to generate county level average wages for every year and county (wage
r(t)
). Using
the same annual labour survey, another labor cost variable, wage_ind
j
r(t)
is generated by averaging
wages of employees in a given county as well as industrial sector. Out of the 3000 possible industry-
county-year combinations, we were able to create 2737 industry specific wages directly from the data,
while estimated the remaining 263 wage figures. Note that for such industry-year-county combinations,
hardly any FDI investment has taken place – they were mostly used as counterfactuals for running the
logistic regressions. Average regional and industry specific wages were created by weighting firm level
(gross) wage information by the size of firms (employment) so as to generate a wage level, a firm may
expect when choosing a location.
For every employee there is a description of the job, and this allows to create a special blue-collar wage
for (almost) every industry and county: wage_bc
j
r(t)
and hence, wage_bc
j
r(t)
may be used together with
wage_ind
j
r(t)
.
In this paper a few measures of development are chosen to take care of major sector independent vari-
ables
10
. Data come from the regional database of the Central Statistics Office.
Size_of_road_network measures the size of national road network within the given county and it is equal
to size (in kilometers) of all national road (including motorways) divided by the area of the county (in
km
2
). Note that there has been little change in the size of the network throughout the observed period,
the total size rose by about 3%. Size_of_telephone_network shows the number of telephone lines with-
in the given county. This measures the number of landline stations per county. This is a frequently used
variable to proxy development of the infrastructure and thus, non-transportation linked transaction
costs. Note however, that as a result of widespread use of mobile phones, this measure may have just
turned to be a poor proxy by now. Number_of_college_students represents number of students enrolled
in higher education at institutions within the given county. This should proxy the abundance of man-
agement and R&D knowledge in the county.
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10
In a related paper (Békés and Muraközy [2005]) several more variables of local development and municipal policy are tested.
Description of the data and variables
19
In addition to measures of development, population_density indicates the size of population divided by
size of the area of the county and it will pick up an agglomeration externality: it may be cheaper to sell
products when people are close to each other. However, a negative sign would suggest that this urban-
ization effect is outweighed by higher land prices.
First, conditional logit (CL) models will be estimated to study the influence of input-output linkages, labour
market conditions and market access on investment decisions in Hungary. A key achievement that
allows for such a structure to be used here is the Random Utility Maximisation framework of McFadden
(1974). In this framework, firms are assumed to make decisions maximising expected profits, but given
the scarcity of information and errors made by analysts, the maximisation procedure per se is less than
perfect. Thus, profit (or utility for consumers) is a random function of explanatory variables.
11
5.1. Conditional logit model
The methodology widely applied in spatial probability choice modelling is the conditional logit model
based on Carlton (1983). Decision probabilities are modelled in a partial equilibrium setting with agents
pursuing profit maximization behavior. Thus, they maximise a profit function like (15) subject to uncer-
tainty. Apart from the observed characteristics of firms, such as sector and location (entering the profit
equation), unobserved locational characteristics, measurement errors or improper maximization will
determine actual profits. Note, that we do not observe either derived or actual profits, but perceive loca-
tional decisions of firms.
12
The explained variable is the location choice of firms so the choice variable
is 1 if the investment took place in that particular county and 0 for the remaining 19 counties.
Taking all potential effects into account, a firm i (where i  {1,...,N}) of sector j (where j  {1,...,J}) locating
in region r (where r  {1,...,R}) will attain a profit level dependent on various industry and region depend-
ent variables. Importantly, not all of these variables matter, as the choice of region is independent on indi-
vidual firm or industry characteristics. Thus, if agents maximise expected utility in this partial equilibrium set-
ting, the number of firms in a region is related to the expected profit, as laid down in the profit function.
The profit equation (15) in parsimonious form for a firm i in industry j and region r is:
(22)
In order to be able to use results of McFadden (1974), we need to assume that the error term, ,
is independently distributed across r and i , and has a type I extreme value (or Gumbel) distribution. The
error term reflects unobserved terms as well those that depend on individual firms. A crucial assump-
tion is that unobserved characteristics do not cause correlation, i.e. errors are independent of each
other. In other words, independence here requires that the error for one alternative provides no addi-
tional information about the error for another one. It is likely that this assumption would not hold very well
for the data but the generality of the CL model allows for a detailed investigation. (For details and some
remedies, see section 5.3.)
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5. Estimation methods and results
11
For details, see Maddala (1983), Train (2003, Chapter 3.).
12
In the corporate database there are of course values for profit. However, for multinational companies they are heavily distrorted by transfer pric-
ing as well as various grants and incentives.
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For every spatial option, the investor will compare expected profits and choose region r, provided that
the following condition is fulfilled for ∀l≠r :
(23)
If this is the case, it can be posited that the investor’s probability of selecting location r , provided she
opted to invest in sector j is:
(24)
Estimation is carried out by maximising the log-likelihood:
(25)
where n
j
r
denotes the number of investments carried out in sector j of region r.
In most specifications, fixed effects are added to pick up possible level shifts caused by some omitted
variables such as economic policy. As a result, (22) would become:
(26)
where δ
r
are location specific dummy variables. County level as well as NUTS2 region level dummies
are introduced to the key equations.
Note that coefficients are approximations of the elasticity of the probability of choosing a particular
county for the average investor.
13
For example, considering the most basic setup of specifications, a
10% increase in the local own industry access variable (or 10% rise in the output of the average firm or
a 10% increase in the number of firms) would raise the probability of choosing that county by 2%.
5.2. Results with the conditional logit model
Results with conditional logit are reported in Table 4. In order to control for unobserved county differ-
ences such as those stemming from first nature geography, county or region fixed effects (choice spe-
cific constants) were introduced. To control for the specific case of Budapest, a capital dummy was
added to the regional fixed effects. This had little effect on corporate access variables confirming the
robustness of results. However, many explanatory variables, which depend upon location only, change
little over time, and thus, would loose significance in due course.
By the basic specification (CL1), demand variables such as per capita income and size of population
enter with the expected positive sign, while higher wages are associated with a lower likelihood of firm
location.
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It can be shown that true coefficients are (1-p*) times the estimated figures, where p* is the average probability of choosing a region. Here, p*=1/20=0.05.
Remember, that figures must be taken with care for the logit estimation is carried out with a normalization of the variance of the error term.
The access to own industry output (IPloc) is strongly significant and so is the national (external) market
access variable (MAnat ), or the local (internal) supplier access (SAloc). Access to business services is
also seem to matter for firms. These suggest that input-output linkages are important determinants of
location choice.
14
Overall, the local presence of own industry is one of the most robust determinants of
firm location: carmakers will try to settle where other firms in the motor vehicle industry are settled. Local
suppliers outside one’s industry matter but seem less important. The result that the national market
access is always positive and significant and positive suggests that firms would want to settle close to
non-own industry customers, i.e. a steelmaker will consider all potential corporate customers when
deciding about location.
At the same time, local market access (MAloc) and national supplier access (SAnat ) enter with a neg-
ative sign, and so does national own industry output. Other specifications confirm these results and sev-
eral coefficients, such as (IPnat ), remain surprisingly robust. These results contradict theoretical pre-
dictions but there may be several explanations for such result. Note however, when access variables
were simply aggregated into a local and a national corporate access variable, both entered with a sig-
nificantly positive sign suggesting that overall, input-output linkages outweighed market crowding.
15
First, the correlation between supplier and market access variables is strong (see table 6) and this may
have remained a problem despite previous efforts.
16
Note that this is not a unique problem of this study,
several previous empirical works with both supplier and market access variables faced this correlation
issue (Redding and Venables [2004]). In any case, multicollinearity is mostly a small sample issue, and
we believe that our dataset is large enough to be able to disregard it. Further, when dropping one vari-
able, the sign of others would not change. Second, these variables may pick up the impact of some neg-
ative externality of firm presence. A prime suspect is competition or market structure in general, which
was left out given the infinite number assumption and the fixed markup result of monopolistic competi-
tion type NEG models.
For example, the negative sign on the access to national (external) output of the own industry (IPnat ),
seems to suggest some sort of a competition effect outweighing any agglomeration effect. A negative
sign may indicate such dispersion force: i.e. it is good to have similar firms close, but presence of too
many firms in the neighborhood leads to market competition and under monopolistic competition, more
varieties imply lower profits.
At the some token, variables that enter with a positive sign may capture some other forces. Indeed,
industries like to cluster for other reasons than input-output linkages as it is supported by the strong sig-
nificance of the industrial output variable of the actual sector (IPloc). One must remember that it is
impossible to separate the key motives, such as labour pooling, knowledge spillover or a decrease in
business costs due to information sharing. Despite our effort to filter out co-location due to supplier link-
ages, these problems remain important.
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There are several descriptive evidence that suggest that supplier contacts are known to have been an important factor in the region.For exam-
ple, in Hungary, suppliers to the Suzuki car plant are mostly settled within a close proximity to Suzuki, often in the same county.
15
Further results are available from the author on request.
16
One potential reason for such result may be non-linearity in the data. To see this, I first looked at the access variables (in logs) and found that
their distribution has a one-peaked distribution that looks not very different from a lognormal distribution. Second, quadratic terms were includ-
ed to capture some sort of a hidden effect. It turned out that some quadratic variables were significant but they had no influence on any other
variable.
Estimation methods and results
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Thus, results suggest that within a small area such as the county, agglomeration and input-output link-
ages are more important (as captured by a strongly positive IPloc variable), while market crowding out-
weighs these positive externalities for other counties in proximity (negative IPnat ).
Previous empirical work suggests that one has to approach the impact of labour market on location
choice with great care. The theoretical prediction of the wage coefficient is clear, wages are positively
related to costs and hence a negative sign would suggest that high wages deter firm location. However,
the empirical evidence is mixed with a slight leaning towards the opposite sign.
17
In the basic specifi-
cation (CL1), the wage variable (wage
r(t)
) enters significantly with the expected negative sign confirm-
ing predictions of the theory. However, for other cases, the variable looses its significance and often,
its sign changes.
There may be several explanations, this paper underlines just two such reasons. First, various indus-
tries use different types of labour in terms of skills, and hence, the industry mix of a region may or may
not influence the aggregate wage variable. Second, individual industries use different types of labour
in different shares. The share of blue-collar workers may vary a great deal among sectors and their
wage may differ greatly depending on how skilled they are. Thus, in econometric models like those of
this paper, wages may well reflect an “industry bias” as well as a “skill bias”. An insignificant or a pos-
itive coefficient may just imply that investors are bringing in superior technology and hence, require mo-
re skilled and educated (i.e. more expensive) sort of labour reflected in higher wages.
All specifications using industry specific average wages as blue-collar labour costs suggest that both
variables enter significantly. A negative sign of wage_ind
j
r(t)
confirms the theoretically negative effect of
high wage costs, while the positive sign of wage_bc
j
r(t)
points to the notion that the skill bias important
for blue-collar workers.
Some specifications include non-industry dependent variables of b
r(t)
such as the size of telephone or
road network, both being positively related to firm location. This confirms generally held views that bet-
ter infrastructure is key to attract FDI. The agglomeration variable of population density enters with a
significantly positive coefficient, too. The number of college students, as a proxy of labour marker qual-
ity and research activity in general is also positively related to firm location. One simple possible meas-
ure for agglomeration at the customer level, is the population density. Its sign is not straightforward. On
the one hand, a more dense area allows for lower transportation costs within the county, but on the
other, it may lead to lower land prices and hence lower the cost of the investment. Results of the con-
ditional logit are rather ambiguous (but other models suggest a positive relationship).
For these variables, cross correlations are interesting to look at. Distance to export destinations in neg-
atively correlated with most development related variable. For over 80% of exports goes to Western
Europe, this confirms a strong East-West division in Hungary. It is also clear, that Budapest is special
in terms of these variables (that is not the case for manufacturing based variables).
17
For example, in Figueiredo et al. (2002b) local wage has the expected sign, while in Holl (2004), the wage coefficient is insignificant. There are
various explanations. For example, Figueiredo et al. (2002a) argue that firms consider the wage level as a determinant to locate in a cheaper coun-
try like Portugal (or even more so, Hungary) but within the country, wage has no effect.
5.3. Non-independent errors and the nested logit
The conditional logit modelling has some important limitations. An important restriction for CL models is
(27)
so that “relative probabilities for any two alternatives depend only on the attributes of those two alter-
natives” (Wooldridge [2002, p. 501]). This is called the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA). In our case, this posits that all locations are considered similar (having controlled for
explanatory variables) by the decision making agent, yielding independent errors across individuals
and choices. When IIA is assumed, an investor will look at all regions as equally potential places for
investment. Thus complex choice scenarios cannot be included. Indeed unobserved site characteris-
tics (such as actual geography) may well give way to correlation across choices.
To check whether the IIA assumption is strong enough, Hausman tests were run (Hausman and
McFadden [1984]) for seven NUTS2 regions. Results (reported in Table 7.) show that the IIA assump-
tions almost always fail at the 1% level, suggesting that a more complex structure should be used. As
is frequent for such exercise, asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test fail for some occasions and
hence, the generalized Hausman test was applied. Given that there is no theoretical support for having
seven regions, so an alternative structure with three larger regions (West, Central, East) was drawn, and
the tests were run only to indicate that IIA fails universally for such tree-structure.
One possible way to control for violations of the IIA assumption is to introduce dummy variables for each
individual choice as suggested by Train (1986). Indeed, several specifications were run with fixed
effects. To see if the introduction of fixed effects solved the problem, Hausman tests were re-run for a
fixed effect specification. It did not solve the problem, all conditional logit structures may be rejected
for violating IIA assumptions. This situation, often appearing in exercises similar to our own, requires the
nested logit model to be called upon.
The nested logit model uses the same profit function as the conditional logit (15) but works with a deci-
sion tree. The firm now first picks a region out of upper level alternatives u, and then chooses a county
within the already selected region, out of lower level alternatives, r. Importantly, no assumption on a two-
step decision-making is necessary. It is enough to believe that certain counties are competing more
closely than others.
Location probability in a county r, depends on probability of location in a region (u, upper level alter-
natives) times the probability of location in a county (m, lower level alternatives) in the given region:
(28)
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where Z explains the choice of an upper level (region) alternative in the conditional logit case
.
(30)
In this last equation, the inclusive value, , will tell us if the nest helps. From
Maddala (1983), we know that and when ∀ , the NL collapses to CL, while if ∀ ,
the upper nest matters only, i.e. firms choose a county randomly within the selected region.
It is important to stick to the RUM framework here as well, so a random utility maximization consistent
nested logit had to be applied (Heiss [2002]). As a result, deterministic utilities must be scaled by the
inverse of the IV
m
parameters ( ) in the conditional utility. This implies different scaling of the utilities
across nests but allows the interpretation of β’Z as RUM model.
(31)
5.4. Nested logit results
There are two natural nests: the seven NUTS2 regions, three broad geographical areas: East, Central
and West as well as our preferred 4 regions of East, West, South and the capital plus its neighbourhood.
Results, reported in Table 5, provide solid support for many of our previous results. According to spec-
ification NL1, the basic variables: per capita income, size, local and national corporate access, busi-
ness services access and wages, all enter significantly and with the expected sign. With disaggregat-
ed variables (specifications NL2-NL5), own industry output remains one of the best performing vari-
ables along with national (external) market access. Better local (internal) supplier access remains a
point of attraction, too. National (external) access to suppliers and the own industry remain to enter with
the negative sign. Other explanatory variables loose or gain significance depending on the nest.
Specification test of the nested logit model is based on the values of the inclusive value parameters.
The LR test of homoskedasticity (all values equal one) is clearly rejected for all specifications. No single
IV
m
is ever close to the unity, suggesting that all parts of the nest is well warranted. However, greater
than unity figures in general indicate some specification problem of the random utility framework. We
checked for several possible nests – Table 5 reports results for three such nest – but failed to get inclu-
sive values at or below unity. Once again, the model is likely to be misspecified, although Train (2003,
Chapter 4.) discusses studies that prove that for several cases, RUM may well be consistent with IV val-
ues above one.
5.5. Count data methods and results
A great advantage of CL approach is its direct link with random utility maximisation. However, there may
be several specification problems with the conditional logit model. The IIA assumption fails and the
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choice of a certain nested logit specification may seem somewhat arbitrary. Thus, one can apply count
data models to see robustness of results. This comes with an additional advantage: the easy inclusion
of time dummies. Indeed, during transition, there may have been important changes over time – such
as shifts in public policy – affecting regions differently.
In an effort to check robustness of CLM, count data models are used in this section, with the depend-
ent variable representing the number or frequency of a particular event, in our case, the number of
investments in a particular county. In these models, coefficients explain why x% more projects took
place in county A relative to county B.
Define n
j
r(t)
as the number of FDI investments in industry j, region r and time t. The explanatory variables
are exactly the same as used in the previous sections.
(32)
Importantly, Figueiredo et al. (2004) shows that the conditional logit equation as well as the Poisson
model may stem from the same random utility maximisation model when firm-level characteristics are
treated in a discrete fashion (such as operation in an industry). Alternative to the CL model, we can
assume that n
j
r(t)
is the explained variable and n
j
r(t)
are independently Poisson distributed with
(33)
where d
j
are dummy variables indicating if a firm is in industry j.
18
For every year, firm entry data were aggregated by industry and county, and Poisson regressions were
run with the same set of explanatory variables used at logistic regressions (see Table 8). As expected,
results were generally – but not always confirmed. Own industry output, once again proved to be one
of the best performing variables with a coefficient close to 0.2, along with national (external) market
access. However, supplier access variables swapped signs compared to logistic regressions. Other
explanatory variables, such as distance from borders performed well, with even the number of college
students making a difference. In a Poisson model context, the road network was unimportant while pop-
ulation density entered with a significantly positive variable suggesting the presence of some urban-
ization economies.
The Poisson model has the advantage of being closely related to the conditional logit, but it assumes
that the conditional variance of the dependent variable, λ equals the conditional mean of λ. However,
equidispersion is rare property in reality, and for most cases, the variance is larger than the mean.
Overdispersion may be treated, but in a more general, negative binomial model that allows to test the
null hypothesis of equidispersion.
19
Given their easy applicability, no wonder that both the Poisson and
the negative binomial model have been used in location research (e.g. Basile [2004]).
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Moreover, Figueiredo et al. (2004, p. 203.) shows that the Poisson concentrated log likelihood is “identical to the conditional logit likelihood with
some constraints.”
19
Importantly, the negative binomial model yields more efficient test statistics and prevents us from drawing overly optimistic conclusions (see
Cameron and Trivedi [1998]).
Estimation methods and results
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The negative binomial distribution may be considered as a generalized Poisson, where the mean does
not equal the variance. This deviation is represented with a dispersion parameter, α. The case with α=0
corresponds to equidispersion, and in that case the model collapses into a Poisson model.
Specification tests (LR test with one sided χ2 statistics) suggested that the Poisson model is misspeci-
fied. However, results, reported as specification CNT5 and CNT6, suggest significance. In many cases
even the magnitude of coefficients for the negative binomial are identical to those of the Poisson model
despite the failure of the LR test. This robustness is not unusual in the literature, for example Smith and
Florida (1994) finds a similar pattern for Poisson, negative binomial and even for the tobit model.
5.6. Comparisons through time and industry
So far we have pooled data for both years and industries. It is interesting to see to what extent coeffi-
cients change through periods in time and across groups of industries.
20
To see how variables evolved
through time, fixed effect conditional logit regressions were run for three periods: 1993-1995, 1996-1998
and 1999-2002. Many coefficients, including those related to the input-output linkages changed little
through time. However, high wages seems to have been more of a deterrent in early nineties with the
coefficient loosing significance after 2000 or skill-content, undetected by industry specific wages, has
become more important of late.
Regression results would be different if run sector by sector. Robustness of previous results was first
checked by running regressions – leaving out one industry at a time. Results varied marginally only.
Second, some industries were grouped into two categories: light industry (e.g. textile, clothing, etc.) and
electronics/equipment (inc. electric machinery, audio-video manufacturing, etc.), and regressions were
run for one group at a time. Results are broadly robust but some vary substantially. Light industries
slightly prefer wealthier sites – probably given a lower export content in their sales. Similarly, distance
from export destinations was more important for the equipment/machinery/vehicles sector. Wages were
much more important for the light industries, whereas higher skill-content sectors appreciated skills
more. Interestingly, the national own industry output variable (IPnat ) turned to be negative for the light
industry group only, suggesting that nationwide competition was stronger for lower value added and/or
less differentiated good producing sectors.
As a caveat here, note that comparison within a logistic framework is not directly possible. In a logit
regression, the variance of the error term cannot be estimated together with parameters and as thus,
the variance term is normalized to one. As a result, a difference in values may only be due to a differ-
ence in the variance of the error term. Hence a difference in the coefficient value may be meaningless.
5.7. New firms versus acquisitions
So far, we have looked at locational determinants of new firms only. We have data on foreign acquisi-
tions that may either be considered as privatization deals or investment by a foreign firm in an existing
20
Results are available on request from the author.
Hungarian company. Given that a substantial effort has been invested into linking firms that changed
legal status but remained the same company in essence, our acquisition data include episodes when
a firm exited and a new firm appeared at the same area with different ownership but very similar struc-
ture. There are all together 870 foreign acquisitions, out of which some 200 being related to privatisa-
tion i.e. a foreign share replacing state or municipal ownership.
Our fixed effect conditional logit regressions were run for both groups: new firms and foreign acquisi-
tions. The good news is that results, in terms of sign and significance, are almost always unchanged for
these groups, although some access variables loose significance.
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This paper focused on location decisions of foreign investors within one country, using econometric
models with discrete dependent variables that are generated from a tax report based dataset of
Hungarian firms. The rapid appearance of foreign-owned manufacturing sites offered a great opportu-
nity: studying the geographic properties of a large number of new firms entering a region previously
closed to foreigners. Some conclusions may be drawn regarding theory and its empirical support as
well as the validity of some methodologies.
Taking a snapshot of the economy rather than modelling long run equilibrium, one of our aims has been
to bring a widely used class of new economic geography models to the data and investigate how well
various channels of agglomeration and dispersion forces work. In the paper a possible way was shown
to link input-output linkage based NEG theory and a tax report based dataset – building on variables
that had been generated out of firm level sales figures. In order to see validity of results, specifications
of conditional logit, nested logit, Poisson and negative binomial models were tested. Although specifi-
cation tests suggested that econometric models have generally been misspecified in one way or anoth-
er, most coefficients kept their respective sign throughout specifications, and similar log likelihoods (or
McFadden’s pseudo R
2
measures, where available) suggested that most specifications are by and
large equally supported by data.
Results that proved to be robust through discrete choice and count data specifications suggest that
there is indeed an agglomeration effect for companies in play and input-output linkages work their way
through supplier and market access providing a key reason for co-location. The importance of indus-
trial clustering has been robustly shown and some support of agglomeration externalities was found as
well. Access to firms operating in the same industry as the new firm as well as proximity of potential cus-
tomers throughout the country seemed to be a persistently important determinant of location choice.
This provides some empirical support to NEG models with input and output linkages.
However, some important difficulties have arisen. First, the fact that a large share of action is going on with-
in the own industry suggests that disentangling various agglomeration forces within an industry has once
again proved to be rather difficult. As a result, when data permits, one would probably need to increase
“data resolution” and leave two-digit industries (such as electronic equipment production) for three-digit
sectors (e.g. medical equipment). Second, the unexpected sign of some access variables suggest that
disregarding market structure and in particular, competition, the effect of which may have been picked up
by some access variables, is a grave weakness of the model. Indeed, we now reckon that competition
must be studied more directly, allowing access variables to pick up less of market crowding effects.
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Wages have been important in explaining firm location. However, unless industry specific wages are
used, the impact of labor costs are mostly undetected. Further, the addition of blue-collar wage costs
that reflect the heterogeneity (in skills and training) of a relatively immobile and seemingly homogenous
workforce improves our understanding.
6. Conclusions and future research
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Unfortunately, modelling competition is rather difficult. Nevertheless, in the empirical literature one possible proxy used to capture the impact of
market structure is a variant of the Herfindahl index.
The export distance measures are overwhelmingly significant with the expected negative sign in any
specification. For a small and open economy this is not surprising. Most governments emphasise the
construction of major East-West or North South corridors and the importance of this notion is confirmed
by the strong significance of our road distance to borders parameter. However, positive coefficient of
the road network variable suggest that building roads within a county will foster FDI inflow as well.
Finally, some policy conclusion may be drawn – with caution. First, most of the industries do have a
strong tendency to settle where other similar firms have already settled. Spending money on incentives
to have them established elsewhere may be inefficient, and instead labour migration should be made
easier, for example via development of temporary housing conditions. Further, subsidies to large firms
may be efficient as long as they lure in similar firms. Second, input-output linkages are important. Thus,
improving the relationship between suppliers and multinationals is key to fostering more investment.
With a recent experience of loosing multinationals to non-EU Eastern Europe and China, this may be
ever more important. Third, other explanatory variables that were found to be a significant are telephone
and road network, confirming the widely held view on the importance of local infrastructure.
22
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However, one must bear in mind that several general equilibrium NEG models would show how construction of motorways may have an adverse
effects in the long run. See Baldwin et al. (2003) for theory and Puga (2002) for some empirical support.
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Part of this paper was written when I was visiting the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, I am grateful for their hos-
pitality. I am also indebted to the CEU-Labor Project where major data cleaning was carried. For com-
ments and suggestions I thank László Halpern, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Péter Benczúr, Fabrice Defever,
Gábor Kézdi, István Kónya, and Álmos Telegdy as well as seminar participants at Central European
University, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Warsaw University, HWWA seminar in Hamburg and Sieps seminar
at the Stockholm University.
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7.1. Firms versus plants
A key issue is the exact nature of firm location. In effect, plant level data would be necessary to repre-
senting the actual production site. However, only firm level data are available instead. As a result, we
may have data on a firm headquarter, rather than its production plant distorting our results a great deal.
To check this, two exercises were carried out .
First, the National Corporate Register was consulted to see how large foreign manufacturers such as
Siemens, Philips or IBM were incorporated in Hungary. Apparently, these multinationals established
separate entities for many of their operations. Siemens AG, a German electronics good manufacturer
established a dozen firms up to 2003 including Siemens kft, responsible for all retail activities, Siemens
“Finance” (Financial Services), or Siemens “Telefongyár” (Telecom). IBM has its main production plant
as part of IBM “Data Storage Systems” in Székesfehérvár (Fejér county), while consulting business is
carried out via IBM “Üzleti Tanácsadó” registered in Budapest downtown.
The best example for separation of plants by industries may be the Dutch giant, Philips. It has invested
in various firms including Philips “Components” (machinery) in Gyõr (Gyõr-Sopron-Moson county), Phi-
lips “Industries Hungary” (electronics) in Székesfehérvár (Fejér county), Philips “Monitor Industries” in
Szombathely (Vas county) and Philips “Hungary Sales” in Budapest. A similar structure may be per-
ceived by many other major multinational companies including Audi producer “Porsche Inter Auto”, or
Electrolux, whose production plant is situated somewhere in the countryside as one firm, while another
one in Budapest is responsible for sales or foreign trade.
One should expect that the most problematic bias would come from an over-representation of the cap-
ital city given that many firms that entered Hungary, first established a HQ in Budapest. Thus, in a sec-
ond effort, industry-level aggregates from two sources were compared: The APEH complete firm level
corporate dataset and plant level employer data of the Labour Market Surveys. It showed that the
share of Budapest by industries is just a few percentage points higher in the firm level data. This also
supports the assumption that the application of firm level data should be of no great concern in our
practice.
7.2. Corrections to the data
There has been serious effort invested in cleaning the data and several corrections were made to the
original APEH dataset by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the CEU Labor Project
23
and the author. There has
been three important steps. First, Longitudinal links for foreign firms were improved using data provid-
ed by Hungarian statistics office KSH on corporate entry and exit. CEU Labor Project looked for other
longitudinal links in which the firms did not simply appear under a new id number, but actually split up
7. Appendix
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For a basic description, see Brown et al. (2004) and for details see Telegdy (2004).
into several firms or were formed via a merger. These allowed to keep track most but not all of firms
under transformation. Second, The ownership structure of new firms was repaired in many cases to
make sure that foreign ownership reflected the most likely case. Information from balance sheets and
adjacent years’ values were used.
Third, sales data for all firms were checked to avoid typing errors. For many firms, sales data were miss-
ing. Further problems I found and/or learned from others working with the same or similar datasets
included: (1) 0 is imputed instead of actual figures for sales, (2) thousands written instead of millions,
(3) one digit is left out making sales figure be 1/10 of actual data, (4) sales and export sales figures
swapped. Overall, I made modifications reaching almost 2% of the total dataset. In some cases, sales
could be estimated by using other balance sheet figures, and in others, the simple average of sales
data at (t–1) and (t+1) was used.
As a final note, remember that for some discrete choice datasets, one has to worry about classification
error i.e. measurement error in the left hand side variable. Having only a list of firm location decisions, the
actual place may be mistyped or simply poorly gathered. This is not the case with the APEH dataset,
since tax reports are submitted by the company to the regional Tax Authority office, and there are one
per office per county (except for Budapest where there are three). As a result, there should be very little
error in the choice of location variable.
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Table 1
New foreign manufacturing firms per Hungarian counties (1993-2002)
Source: KSH, APEH Corporate dataset, author’s calculations.
New firms New firms New firms
Inhabitants Number of per capita during first during second
Counties (’000) new firms* (‘000) five years five years
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 583 102 0.17 48 54
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 738 39 0.19 73 66
Békés 393 79 0.20 45 34
Hajdú-Bihar 550 118 0.21 62 56
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 413 98 0.24 62 36
Somogy 334 104 0.31 73 31
Tolna 247 87 0.35 50 37
Nógrád 218 80 0.37 43 37
Heves 324 124 0.38 72 52
Fejér 428 168 0.39 111 57
Csongrád 426 184 0.43 107 77
Bács-Kiskun 542 236 0.44 146 90
Pest 1123 504 0.45 278 226
Veszprém 368 183 0.50 112 71
Zala 297 164 0.55 95 69
Baranya 402 235 0.58 147 88
Komárom-Esztergom 316 197 0.62 123 74
Vas 267 189 0.71 107 82
Gyõr-Moson-Sopron 440 346 0.79 213 133
Budapest city 1708 2013 1.18 1167 846
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Table 2a
New foreign manufacturing firms by industries
Source: APEH Corporate dataset, author’s calculations.
(NACE code) Industries All FDI Greenfield
(17) Textile 327 280
(18 & 19) Cloths, leather 452 397
(20 & 21) Paper and wood products 475 414
(22) Press 648 510
(23 & 24) Refinery and chemicals 208 156
(25) Plastic rubber 383 319
(26) Other non-metalic 283 229
(27) Metal -basic 68 54
(28 Metal -fabricated 725 602
(29 Machinery 632 525
(30 Office equipment 57 51
(31 Electric machines 208 179
(32 & 33) Audio-video, PC, etc. instruments 429 347
(34 & 35) Motor vehicles 153 133
(36) Furniture, etc. 302 261
Total manufacturing (ex-food) 5350 4457
Table 2b
Average unit transportation costs by industry
Source: World Bank, APEH Corporate dataset, author’s calculations. *Unit price in USD/kg – original World Bank data in ISIC
terms, unit prices were transformed to NACE categories and aggregated by the author.
(NACE code) Industries Unit price *
(17) Textile 11.6
(18 & 19) Cloths, leather 31.5
(20 & 21) Paper and wood products 5.8
(22) Press 22
(23 & 24) Refinery and chemicals 18
(25) Plastic rubber 12
(26) Other non-metalic 8
(27) Metal -basic 6
(28 Metal -fabricated 31
(29 Machinery 27
(30 Office equipment 140
(31 Electric machines 45
(32 & 33) Audio-video, PC, etc. instruments 140
(34 & 35) Motor vehicles 41
(36) Furniture, etc. 10
Total manufacturing (ex-food) -
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Table 3
Summary statistics
KSH: Hungarian Central Statistics Office, „AKM”: Input-output tables, „LMS”: Annual Labour Market Survey, APEH: Hungarian
Tax Authority’s corporate database. NB All variables in estimations are taken in logs.
Variable Description Source Mean Std. Dev.
IPC income per capita (Ft, ‘000) KSH 87.2 27.6
Pop population size (‘000) KSH 505 339
IPloc own industry local output APEH, „AKM” of KSH 649437 2637335
Ipnat own industry national access APEH, „AKM” of KSH 231341 501525
SAloc local supplier access APEH, „AKM” of KSH 1050664 2810798
MAloc local market access APEH, „AKM” of KSH 1879780 5910528
SAnat national supplier access APEH, „AKM” of KSH 354441 574277
MAnat national market access APEH, „AKM” of KSH 621667 1041976
BAloc local business access APEH, „AKM” of KSH 7269205 3058622
Tel_size Size of telephone network KSH 123244 158637
(fixed line subscribers)
Road_size Size of highway network (km) KSH 1526.8 563.77
Edu_size number of college students KSH 9803 7332.54
Density population density: inhabitants/area KSH 0.24 0.69
dSouth Distance of Southern export border (km) HAS-Institute of Economics 254 117
dWest Distance of Western export border (km) HAS-Institute of Economics 233 100
dAirport Distance of Airport (km) HAS-Institute of Economics 136 684
Wage local wage (Ft) Minsitry of Labor „LMS” 31204 14371
Wage_ind local, own industry wage (Ft) Minsitry of Labor „LMS” 30362 16232
Wage_bc local blue-collar wage (Ft) Minsitry of Labor „LMS” 25585 12834
Wage_off local office wage (Ft) Minsitry of Labor „LMS” 38096 22391
Wage_man local manager wage (Ft) Minsitry of Labor „LMS” 80120 66476
Dlr Road distance between cities (km) HAS-Institute of Economics 190 103
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Table 4
Conditional logit estimates
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Specification CL (1) CL (2) CL (3) CL (4) CL (5) CL (6)
Fixed effects no no 1 1 20 20
Region FE no no 7 7 no no
Ln (income per capita) 0.91*** (0.17) 0.03 (0.22) -0.44 (0.27) -0.16 (0.21) -0.35 (0.38) 0.06 (0.35)
Ln (population size) 0.20** (0.09) -0.19 (0.34) -0.50 (0.36) -0.43 (0.36) 0.01 (1.22) 1.47*** (0.24)
Ln(own industry local output) 0.22*** (0.01) 0.20*** (0.01) 0.21*** (0.02) 0.21*** (0.02) 0.21*** (0.02) 0.21*** (0.02)
Ln (own industry national access -0.08 (0.06) -0.19*** (0.06) -0.16** (0.07) -0.17** (0.07) -0.24*** (0.07) -0.26*** (0.07)
Ln(local supplier access) 0.10** (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.11** (0.05) 0.10* (0.05) 0.11** (0.05) 0.09 (0.06)
Ln(local market access) -0.17*** (0.03) -0.17*** (0.03) -0.10** (0.05) -0.12** (0.05) -0.08 (0.05) -0.09* (0.05)
Ln (national supplier access -0.35*** (0.12) -0.88*** (0.15) -0.62*** (0.15) -0.60*** (0.15) -0.99*** (0.17) -1.04*** (0.17)
Ln (national market access) 0.64*** (0.01) 0.41*** (0.12) 0.65*** (0.13) 0.60*** (0.13) 0.47*** (0.14) 0.40*** (0.14)
Ln (local business access) 0.33*** (0.05) -0.006 (0.07) -0.10 (0.08) -0.07 (0.08) -0.17* (0.10) -0.14 (0.10)
Ln (local wage) -0.82** (0.39) -0.07 (0.45) 0.60 (0.52) 1.23** (0.63)
Ln (local, own industry wage) -0.40** (0.19) -0.37* (0.19)
Ln (local blue-collar wage) 0.42** (0.20) 0.37* (0.20)
Ln (number of college students) 0.51 (0.28) 0.78** (0.32) 0.79** (0.32)
Ln (size of highway network) 0.25** (0.11) 0.89* (0.51) 0.98* (0.51) -0.83 (0.59) -0.61 (0.69)
Ln (size of telephone network) 0.18** (0.09) 0.25*** (0.10) 0.19** (0.09) -0.10 (0.13)
Ln (population density) 0.09 (0.07) -0.42 (0.61)
Ln (avg. distance export borders) -0.62*** (0.13) -0.53*** (0.14) -0.60*** (0.14) -1.40* (0.84) -0.67 (0.44)
Ln (distance to Airport) -0.62*** (0.13)
Ln (distance to Western border) -0.39*** (0.06)
Ln (distance to Southern border) -0.22*** (0.05)
LR chi squared 4557 4557 4557 4310 4557 4310
Log likelihood 5187 5331 5347 5216 5440 5308
McFadden's pseudo R squared 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Number of observations -10759 -10686 -10678 -10433 -10631 -10387
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Table 5
Nested logit estimates
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Specification NL1 NL2 NL3 NL4 NL5 NL6
Top level alternatives 3 3 4 4 4 7
FE NO YES NO YES YES NO
Ln (income per capita) 0.67*** (0.18) 0.13 (0.55) -0.19 (0.31) -0.58 (0.52) 0.45 (0.38) -0.30 (0.35)
Ln (population size) 0.32*** (0.13) 2.67 (1.90) 1.74*** (0.42) 2.35*** (0.59) 2.61*** (0.63) -0.53 (0.58)
Ln (local corporate access) 0.18*** (0.04)
Ln (national corporate access) 0.24*** (0.04)
Ln(own industry local output) 0.37*** (0.04) 0.36*** (0.03) 0.35*** (0.03) 0.36*** (0.03) 0.28*** (0.02)
Ln (own industry national access -0.39*** (0.11) -0.30*** (0.10) -0.43*** (0.11) -0.48*** (0.11) -0.17** (0.07)
Ln(local supplier access) 0.21** (0.09) 0.08 (0.08) 0.23*** (0.08) 0.19** (0.08) 0.09* (0.05)
Ln(local market access) -0.14 (0.09) -0.18** (0.07) -0.04 (0.08) -0.03 (0.08) -0.05 (0.04)
Ln (national supplier access -1.51*** (0.27) -0.96*** (0.22) -1.45*** (0.26) -1.58*** (0.26) -0.74*** (0.16)
Ln (national market access) 0.46** (0.22) 0.84*** (0.19) 0.66*** (0.22) 0.60*** (0.22) 1.03*** (0.13)
Ln (local business access) 0.29*** (0.19) 0.48*** (0.12) -0.28 (0.18) -0.35* (0.18) -0.02 (0.11)
Ln (local wage) -1.34*** (0.45) 1.88** (0.84) 0.91 (0.69)
Ln (local, own industry wage) -0.32 (0.22) -0.42** (0.21) -0.38** (0.22)
Ln (avg. distance export borders) 0.80 (1.75) -1.52*** (0.33) 0.19 (0.88) 0.96 (1.08)
Ln (size of highway network) -0.29 (0.96) 0.23*  (0.11)
Ln (number of college students) 1.38*** (0.52)
Ln (Size of telephone network) -0.11 (0.22) 0.21* (0.11)
Inclusive value 1 0.96 1.78*** 1.99*** 1.96*** 1.90*** 1.46***
Inclusive value 2 1.10* 3.33*** 3.09*** 2.87*** 4.41 1.84***
Inclusive value 3 0.86** 1.95*** 2.99*** 3.37** 1.89*** 2.28***
Inclusive value 4 2.82*** 1.87*** 3.53*** 2.11***
Inclusive value 5 1.51***
Inclusive value 6 1.16
Inclusive value 7 1.71***
Method NLRUM NLRUM NLRUM NLRUM NLRUM NLRUM
Number of observations 4457 4412 4412 4457 4412 4457
Model LR chi2 4964 5379 5235 5490 5385 6505
Log likelihood -10869 -10527 -10599 -10606 -10524 -12774
LR test of IVs=1 76.05 (0.00) 49.18 (0.00) 95.71 (0.00) 51.68 (0.00) 56.9 (0.00) 103.8 (0.00)
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Table 6
Cross correlation of variables
Access variables
Ln (own ind Ln (own ind Ln (local Ln (local Ln (nat Ln (nat 
loc acc) nat acc) supp acc) market acc) supp acc) market acc)
Ln (own industry local output) 1.00
Ln (own industry national access 0.57 1.00
Ln (local supplier access) 0.53 0.66 1.00
Ln (local market access) 0.60 0.52 0.33 1.00
Ln (national supplier access 0.42 0.74 0.32 0.70 1.00
Ln (national market access) 0.41 0.48 0.58 0.41 0.55 1.00
Development related variables (including Budapest)
ln (income Ln (bus. LN (local Ln (distance Ln (tele- Ln (highway 
per capita) service acc) wage) border) phone netw) netw)
ln (income per capita) 1.00
Ln (business service access) 0.54 1.00
LN (local wage) 0.11 0.71 1.00
Ln (weighted distance of export borders) -0.56 -0.24 -0.11 1.00
Ln (size of telephone network) 0.43 0.93 0.67 -0.14 1.00
Ln (size of highway network) -0.20 -0.30 -0.02 -0.37 -0.34 1.00
Development related variables (excluding Budapest)
ln (income Ln (bus. LN (local Ln (distance Ln (tele- Ln (highway 
per capita) service acc) wage) border) phone netw) netw)
ln (income per capita) 1.00
Ln (business service access) 0.09 1.00
LN (local wage) -0.02 0.84 1.00
Ln (weighted distance of export borders) -0.63 -0.18 -0.08 1.00
Ln (size of telephone network) -0.03 0.90 0.75 -0.04 1.00
Ln (size of highway network) 0.21 0.05 0.06 -0.52 -0.05 1.00
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Table 7
Generalised Hausman tests of IIA
χ2 test (p-value)
7 NUTS2 regions No county fixed effects With county fixed effects
All versus no Region1 147.34*** (0.00) 209.79*** (0.00)
All versus no Region2 76.03*** (0.00) 47.59*** (0.00)
All versus no Region3 41.18*** (0.00) 69.68*** (0.00)
All versus no Region4 39.83*** (0.00) 44.28** (0.01)
All versus no Region5 19.05 (0.161) 25.80 (0.47)
All versus no Region6 49.39*** (0.00) 51.68*** (0.00)
All versus no Region7 37.86*** (0.00) 34.83 (0.11)
χ2 test (p-value)
3 large regions: West, East, Central No county fixed effects With county fixed effects
All versus no West 96.34 (0.00) 143.98 (0.00)
All versus no Central 60.80 (0.00) 79.89 (0.00)
All versus no East 106.36 (0.00) 43.65 (0.00)
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Table 8
Location choice with count data regressions
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively + χ01: is a one-sided χ2
test of the over-dispersion parameter, α.
Specification CNT(1) CNT(2) CNT(3) CNT(4) CNT(5) CNT(6)
Model Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson NegBin NegBin
FE No No County Area, time No Area, time
Ln (income per capita) 1.62*** (0.11) 0.65*** (0.15) -0.10 (0.26) 0.39*** (0.12) 0.92*** (0.19) 0.53*** (0.16)
Ln (population size) 0.82*** (0.07)
Ln(own industry local output) 0.23*** (0.01) 0.24*** (0.01) 0.25*** (0.01) 0.25*** (0.01) 0.26*** (0.01) 0.26*** (0.01)
Ln (own industry national access) -0.02* (0.01) -0.03** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.03** (0.01) -0.12*** (0.02) -0.11*** (0.02)
Ln(local supplier access) -0.09*** (0.02) -0.12*** (0.02) -0.07*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) -0.17*** (0.03) -0.18*** (0.03)
Ln(local market access) -0.06*** (0.02) -0.08*** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.05* (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
Ln (national supplier access) 0.02 (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.04 (0.03) 0.12*** (0.02) 0.25*** (0.04) 0.29*** (0.04)
Ln (national market access) 0.17*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.01 (0.03) 0.13*** (0.02) 0.05* (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03)
Ln (local business access) 0.006 (0.04) -0.10** (0.04) -0.13*** (0.03) 0.47*** (0.02) -0.12* (0.06) 0.43*** (0.03)
Ln (local wage) -0.86*** (0.08)
Ln (local, own industry wage) -0.68*** (0.06) -0.58*** (0.06) -0.81*** (0.07) -0.76*** (0.08) -0.86*** (0.09)
Ln (local blue-collar wage)
Ln (number of college students) 0.73*** (0.07) 0.63*** (0.09)
Ln (size of highway network) 0.05 (0.04) 0.02 (0.06)
Ln (population density: inhabitants/area) 0.11*** (0.05) 0.13* (0.06)
Ln (size of telepohone network) 0.11* (0.06) 0.18** (0.09)
Ln (avg distance export borders) -0.48*** (0.05) -0.40*** (0.07)
Ln Distance of Airport
Ln Distance of Western export border
Ln Distance of Southern export border
LR χ2 6936 6661 6830 6837 1748 1822
Log likelihood -4912 -4579 -4494 -4491 -4163 -4125
McFadden’s pseudo R
2
0.4138 0.4210 0.4318 0.4322 0.1735 0.1809
Over-dispersion α + 0.36 0.33
LR (α=0), χ01 (p-value) 833 (0.00) 730 (0.00)
Number of observations 3000 2737 2737 2737 2737 2737
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